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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF DY-.
ING DECLARATIONS.-[Oklahoma] In
a recent prosecution following a
bank robbery the defendant at-
tempted to introduce into evidence
the dying declaration of a third
party, made before the sheriff of
another jurisdiction, confessing the
crime for which the defendant was
on trial. Held: The dying declara-
tion was not made by the party
whose death was the subject of the
trial and the declaration was in-
admissible as hearsay. Newton v.
State, 71 P. (2d) 122 (Okla. 1937).
The ruling of the court in this case
is in accord with the majority rule
in this country. WIGMORE, EVI-
bENCE (2d ed. 1933) §1430.
The hearsay evidence rule is ap-
plied in the instance where there
is a statement made out of court
testified to or produced in court to
show the truth or falsity of the out
of court statement: i. e., if in court
A testifies that B reported or states
that a certain event X occurred, A's
testimony that B said certain things
is good, but if this testimony is
used to prove event X there is or
ror, since this is hearsay evidence.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1361. There
are at least three reasons usually
recited in support of this rule: (1)
The report of B was not given un-
der oath; (2) There was no oppor-
tunity for cross-examination for
the purpose of substantiating or
qualifying the statements of B; (3)
There has been no confrontation, a
right guaranteed by most constitu-
tions.
There are several exceptions to
the general rule. Among these is
the rule which admits a dying dec-
laration in a homicide case when
the death of the declarant is the
reason for the trial. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §1432. Clearly the prin-
cipal case does not fall within this
exception. Is there any reason
why the exception should be thus
limited in its application? The
rationalization of the exception is
usually presented under two main
arguments: (1) The dying declar-
ant is so near death as to be con-
strained to tell the truth; (2) it is
clearly public necessity to admit
the last words of the victim of a
secret murder in order to convict
the murderer who would otherwise
be protected by the lack of eye-
witnesses. Under the first argu-
ment the courts are generally very
strict concerning the nearness of
death and the knoledge on the
part of the declarant that death is
imminent. Starkey v. People, 17
Ill. 17 (f855); Digby v. People, 113
Ill. 123 (1885). In the case of the
second argument, that of necessity,
it is interesting to note in cases
where there has been adequate
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evidence of another nature, never-
theless the dying declaration of the
victim was admitted in the case
against the defendant. Common-
wealth v. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, 39
Ati. 211 (1898). In that case ne-
cessity was defined as being not
the exigency'of a particular case
but the general necessity to pre-
serve the public peace and pre-
vent secret murders.
There has been another excep-
tion drawn by statute in certain
states to allow the admission of a
dying declaration where the de-
clarant is the victim of a criminal
abortion. OMo CODE ANN. (Throck-
morton, 1936) §12412-1. At com-
mon law if there was an indict-
ment for criminal abortion and
the introduction of the dying vic-
tim's declaration was necessary to
procure a conviction the defendant
would go free. Railing v. Com-
monwealth, 110 Pa. 100, 1 Atl, 314
(1885). If on the other hand there
was an indictment for manslaughter
on the same fact situation the dy-
ing declaration of the victim was
then competent evidence to pro-
cure a conviction. It was the rec-
ognition of the ridiculousness of
the technicality on the part of the
legislatures which gave rise to
statutes like the one cited above.
In the principal case the accused
would have been acquitted if he
could have shown that some per-
son other than himself had com-
mitted the crime for which he was
on trial. However, when he at-
tempted to use the confession of
a third party made on his death-
bed, evidence which tended to
prove that some person other than
the defendant committed the rob-
bery, he was met by this restrictive
rule of evidence and precluded
from thus proving his innocence.
The reasons usually given for al-
lowing dying declarations only
when the declarant's death is the
subject of the trial are these: (1)
No oath. (2) No opportunity for
cross-examination. (3) Such dec-
larations are given on the pointl of
death under the consequent phys-
ical and mental stress, when the
memory may not be clear and the
declarant's mind may be warped in
its conclusions and opinions. (4)
No opportunity for confrontation
of the witness by the accused. (5)
There is a clear opportunity for
fraud. In the face of these ob-
jections most courts allow a dying
declaration to be introduced into
evidence in a homicide case where
the declarant's death is the reason
for the trial.
There must be some reason why
these objections are strong enough
to rule out evidence of this nature
in a robbery case when they are
not sufficient to prevent the use of
the same sort of evidence in the
homicide exception where a man's
life may hang in the balance. Either
the objections apply with greater
force in one case than in the other
or else the factor of necessity is
stronger in one case than in the
other. That there should be any
difference in the force with which
the objections apply seems highly
illogical. Can there be any greater
necessity for allowing such a dec-
laration in a homicide case? In
one breath the courts say that dy-
ing declarations make very objec-
tionable evidence, and in the next
they confine the use of such evi-
dence to a case where a man's life
is in issue. The courts apparently
fear fraud in the ordinary criminal
cases. There would be scarcely
any greater chance for fraud in a
robbery case than in a homicide
case and it would seem to be more
in keeping with justice to run the
CRIMINAL CASES
risk of occasionally acquitting a
guilty man rather than always to
convict a man when, as in the prin.-
cipal case, the defendant's case" was
based to a large extent upon the
dying declaration. There is some
authority for the position opposite
from the principal case. Donnelly
v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 277
(1912) (Holmes' dissent); Hines
v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117
S. E. 843 (1923): WIGmORE, Evi-
DENCE §1432 if. It should be noted
that these authorities require that
there be some substantiating evi-
dence which tends to support the
truth of the dying declaration. In
the principal case there was evi-
dence which seemed to corroborate
ihe confession of the third party;
e. g., the confessor's wife testified
that she had seen bank notes from
the robbed bank in her husband's
possession and certain implements
such as an acetylene torch and
hammer were found in the location
described by the declarant.
In an old North Carolina case in
which a father was suing for loss
of services of his daughter by se-
duction the court admitted the
girl's dying declaration to identify
the defendant. When the defend-
ant took an appeal on the basis of
the strict rule confining the excep-
tion to criminal cases of homicide
where the death of the declarant
was in issue, the supreme court of
the state was not bothered by the
fact that the case was not even a
criminal trial and admitted the
evidence. The words of the court
were these: "Can the practice of
receiving it (dying declaration) to
destroy life, and rejecting it where
a compensation is sought for a civil
injury, derive any sanction from
reason, justice or analogy?" M'Far-
land v. Shaw, 4 N. C. 187, 1"90
(1815). It would seem that age
has not weakened the force of this
argument nor time removed its ap-
propriateness. This rule has been
followed in other cases in North
Carolina as well as in Kansas.
Tatham v. Andrews Mfg. Co., 180
N. C. 627, 105 S. E. 423 (1920);
Williams v. Randolph and Cumber-
land Ry. Co., 182 N. C. 267, 108 S.
E. 95 (1921); Thruston v. Fritz,
91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914).
See N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§160.
There is another exception to the
general hearsay rule which might
be used in such a case as the pres-
ent one. It is the admission in evi-
dence in a civil suit of the declara-
tion of a third party made against
his own pecuniary interest. It has
been pointed out that the reason
why the rule no longer applies to
declarations against penal interest
is because of an historical accident.
WVIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1476. Of course
in the case where a declaration
against penal interest is also a dy-
ing declaration, the argument that
it is true because against the inter-
est of the declarant is not so strong,
unless he is a religious man. be-
cause the penal threat is removed.
On the other hand there is no par-
ticular reason why a third party
would confess a crime which he did
not commit simply to free an ac-
cused man. Although the weight
of authority is with the court in
the principal case, it would seem
that the weight of reason supports
a conclusion opposite from the one
arrived at in this case and many
others like it.
.EDWIN 0. WACK.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES -
VALnrrm.-[Federal] The expan-
sion of the Federal government in-
to the field of crime has gone com-
paratively unnoticed by legal com-
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mentators, in their focusing on the
problems raised by government
control in the fields of agriculture
and industry. Recent Supreme
Court and Federal court decisions
have involved the validity and
constitutionality of six major crim-
inal statutes enacted by Congress
in recent years.
(1) The Lindbergh Act (1934)
48 Stat. 781, 782, punishing the
transporting of a kidnapped person
in interstate commerce by the
death penalty if the jury does not
recommend mercy, and creating a
presumption that state lines have
been crossed where the victim has
not been returned in seven days,
was the basis of convictions in
Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S.
124 (1936); Bailey v. United States,
74 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 10th,
1934); Kelly v. United States, 76
F. (2d) 847 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935)
The statute was also upheld in
United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp.
450 (D. C. N. D. N. J., 1937). The
Bailey case considered and rejected
the arguments that the statute was
invalid because the sentence of life
imprisonment imposed was "cruel
and unusual" punishment within
the prohibition of the Eighth
Amendment and that the inter-
state commerce power does not
embrace the statute.
The Fugitive Felon Act (1934)
48 Stat. 782, a part of the Lind-
bergh Act, punishes a person flee-
ing in interstate commerce from
prosecution or to avoid testifying
in felony cases. In United States
v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65 (D. C. W.
D. Ky., 1936) this was upheld as
within the plenary power of Con-
gress as to interstate commerce.
(2) The Anti-Racketeering stat-
ute (1934) 48 Stat. 979, was sus-
tained by the District Court,
Northern District Illinois, in United
States v. Gramlich, 19 F. Supp. 422
(1937). This act makes it a fel-
ony punishable by one to ten years
imprisonment or by fine of $10,000
or both, to obtain the payment of
money or other valuable considera-
tion by the use of threats or force,
violence, or coercion when such
conduct is in connection to any act
in any degree affecting interstate
or foreign commerce.
(3) Similarly, the Extortion Act
(1932) 47 Stat. 649, which punishes
the sending of threatening com-
munications through the mails, was
sustained in Sutton v.. United
States, 79 F. (2d) 863, (C. C. A.
9th, 1935).
(4) The National Firearms Act
(1934) 48 Stat. 1236-1240, requires
registration of machine guns, rifles
and sawed-off shotguns and taxes
dealers on the sale and the persons
transferring such objects. Sonzin-
sky v. United States, 86 F. (2d)
486 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) and United
States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216
(D. C. S. D. Fla., 1935) are con-
victions under the act.
(5) The constitutionality of the
National Bank Robbery Act (1934)
48 Stat. 783, punishing the robbery
of national banks and providing the
death penalty where a person has
been killed in such a robbery, has
never been attacked, but a convic-
tion thereunder was affirmed in
White v. United States, 85 F. (2d)
268 (Ct. App. D. if C., 1936).
(6) The National Stolen Prop-
erty Act (1934) 48 Stat. 794, in
United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp.
65 (D. C. W. D. Ky., 1936), pun-
ishes anyone who transports or
causes to be transported in inter-
state or foreign commerce, stolen
goods, securities or money to the
value of $5,000 or more, knowing
the same to be stolen. Also pun-
ished are those who receive or dis-
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pose of such property, knowing the
same to be stolen.
The power of Congress to pass
such legislation is predicated upon
the power to levy taxes and to con-
trol interstate and foreign com-
merce. -The taxing power has not
been so widely used as a basis of
criminal statutes: the main ex-
amples, prior to the National Fire-
arms Act, are the Anti-Narcotic
Drug Acts. The Act of 1914, 38
Stat. 785, which made sales unlaw-
ful except to persons giving orders
on forms issued by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, was
held to be a valid revenue measure,
as its prohibitions bore a reason-
able relation to the enforcement of
the tax. United States v. Doremus.
249 U. S. 86 (1919). The Act, as
amended in 1918 to levy, in addi-
tion to the occupation tax upon
dealers and importers, a stamp tax
upon the drug packages, was chal-
lenged in Nigro v. United States,
276 U. S. 332 (1928). But the Su-
preme Court definitely cleared the
way for subsequent regulatory en-
actments based upon the taxing
power by declaring that the right
of a resident of a state to buy nar-
cotics is subject to the power of
Congress to lay an excise tax on its
sale-and the legislation's constitu-
tionality is not affected by the fact
that it may incidentally discourage
the use of the thing taxed.
More widely used as the source
of criminal enactments by Congress
has been the power over interstate
and foreign commerce conferred in
Art. I, §8(2), of the Constitution.
The leading case under the com-
merce clause is Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U. S. 1 (1824), which defined
the broad character of that power
in the words, at p. T88, "'Com-
merce' describes the commercial
intercourse between nations and
parts of nations, in all its branches
and is regulated by prescribing
rules for carrying on that inter-
course." Under the aegis of such
a mandate Congress has seen fit
to enact a multitude of criminal
statutes based upon the commerce
power.
Outstanding cases involving these
examples, prior to those of the last
decade, are: United States v. Pop-
per, 98 Fed. 423 (D. C. N. D. Calif.,
1899) upholding the prohibition
against sending contraceptives in
interstate commerce; The Lottery
Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903) by which
the Congressional Act for the Sup-
pression of Lotteries was validated;
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States,
220 U. S_45 (1911) sanctioning the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906;
Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S.
308 (1913) and Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U. S. 470 (1916) where-
in the White Slave Traffic Act of
1910 was held to be within the
commerce power; Weber v. Freed,
239 U. S. 325 (1915) in which the
Congressional ban upon prize-fight
films was upheld, and Brooks v.
United States, 276 U. S. 432 (1925)
which found the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act Constitutional.
This current of decision leaves no
modern support for such supposed
barriers to Congressional regula-
tion as was announced in Ander-
son v. United States, 71 U. S. 604
(1898), to the effect that interstate
commerce must be directly affected
before Congress may legislate to
control.
The only real obstacle to the ex-
tension of the commerce power as
has been done since .1932 would
seem to be Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U. S. 251 (1918), which held
that the act prohibiting transporta-
tion in interstate commerce of
goods produced in factories em-
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ploying child labor was invalid as
encroaching upon the powers re-
served to the states by the Con-
stitution. There the causal connec-
nection between child labor and
interstate shipment was held too
indirect to justify Congressional
interference. The evil, child labor,
was complete before the goods
were in interstate commerce and,
therefore could not be a causal
element. In all of the criminal
statutes under consideration, the
illegality of the criminal act for
which punishment is sought is ac-
complished before transportation is
accomplished, and under the rul-
ing in Hammer v. Dagenhart
(supra), had the Supreme Court
seen fit to so limit the power of
Congress, it might have done so.
The Supreme Court might have
justified expansion of Federal
power into the field of criminal
law, hitherto a state matter, by
holding that the individual viola-
tor himself was the evil which
passed in interstate commerce.
However, the Court was influenced
by considerations of public policy
as regards the individual state's in-
adequacy to cope with organized
national crime. In line with the
enlightened attitude of the Federal
government toward our social and
economic ills, it is reasonable to
expect a further expansion of Con-
gressional regulations over those





[Federal] The question of a pris-
oner's right to appeal from alleged
improper detention arises once
again. Petitioner was sentenced to
six years in the Federal peniten-
tiary and committed to the marshal
for delivery, "forthwith." After
being placed in the county jail, the
petitioner was relinquished to the
state officials who tried and sen-
tenced him to the state penitenti-
ary. Upon his parole over six
years later, the United States mar-
shal again took custody and incar-
cerated the prisoner in the Federal
penitentiary under the original
commitment, from Which detention
petitioner seeks a writ of habeas
corpus. Denied in the district
court. On appeal, reversed. Smith
v. Swope, 91 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937).
The Federal statute of June 29,
f932, provides that all prison sen-
tences shall begin on the date of
delivery of the prisoner to the
designated penitentiary, except
when prisoner is committed to a
jail, "to await transportation."
(1932) 47 Stat. 381.
It has long been held that a
Federal marshal has no authority
to act other than that given him
by the order of the court. In re
Jennings, 118 Fed. 479 (C. C. E. D.
Mo., 1902), and certainly, the com-
mitment in the present case gave
the marshal no authority to post-
pone sentence or deliver the pris-
oner to state authorities.' The
question thus arises whether sen-
tence can be satisfied by any other
means than Federal imprisonment.
Whether the imprisonment is to
be in a jail or a penitentiary goes
to the nature and, extent of the
punishment and is of the essence
of the sentence, for a penitentiary
sentence is infamous. So there are
pronouncements that a sentence to
imprisonment in a penitentiary
cannot properly be executed in a
jail. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S.
417, 428 (1885); In re Mills, 135 U.
S. 263, 267 (1890); Gorovitz v.
Sartain, 1 F. (2d) 602 (D. C. N.
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D. Ga., 1924). However, the mar-
shal is under a duty to convey the
prisoner within a reasonable time
to the penitentiary. Prior to the
statute, the Federal rule on sen-
tences delayed in execution through
no fault of the prisoner was that
such delay would not work to the
prisoner's detriment. In re Jen-
nings, 118 Fed. 479 (E. D. Mo.,
1902); Ex parte Sichofsky, 273 Fed.
694 (D. C. S. D. Cal., 1921) See
White v. Pearlman, 42 F. (2d) 788
(C. C. A. 10th, 1936) (sentence of
prisoner mistakenly discharged be-
fore expiration of his sentence con-
tinues to run while he is at liber-
ty); Gorovitz v. Sartain, 1 F. (2d)
602 (D. C. N. D. Ga., 1924). The
reasoning is that the prisoner had
started service of his sentence and
the improper action of the marshal
could not cause its abatement. The
ordinary practice for setting the
commencement of sentence was
that sentence should begin to run
with delivery to the designated
penitentiary. Hynes v. United
States, 35 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A.
7th, 1929); Eori v. Aderhold, 53 F.
(2d) 840 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Yutz
v. Pearman, 33 F. (2d) 906 (D. C.
E. D. S. C., 1929). See (1902) 32
Stat. 397. There was sufficient
variance, nevertheless, to provide
the courts with a flexible rule.
United States v. Sautter, 17 F.
Supp. 326 (D. C. M. D. Pa., 1936)
(credit given defendant for time
spent in jail awaiting trial, de-
fendant having been tried and sen-
tenced prior to the 1932 Act);
United States v. Marrin, 227 Fed.
314 (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1915); In re
Morse, 117 Fed. 763 (D. C. Mo.,
1902) (suspended sentence: term
of beginning sentence is to be com-
puted from time of actual incar-
ceration, not from time unneces-
sarily fixed in the judgment). See
Bernstein v. United States, 254 Fed.
967 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) (court can
subsequently change time fixed for
commencement of sentence if for
any reason execution has been de-
layed); Miller v. Snook, 15 F. (2d)
68 (D. C. N. D. Ga., 1926). Hold-
ings that sentence started to
run upon pronouncement, or at
least commitment, were prevalent
enough to allow courts to make
use of them if the occasion de-
manded. Dimmick v. Tompkins,
194 U. S. 540 (1904) (sentence to
hard labor in a state prison does
not commence to run until arrival
at prison and if prisoner secures a
supersedeas pending appeal his
detention meanwhile cannot be
counted as part of his time); Mil-
ler v. Snook, 15 F. (2d) 68 (D. C.
N. D. Ga., 1926) (prisoner sen-
tenced to penitentiary, sentence to
run from date of sentence).
Under the statute, however, a
new obstacle obstructs similar
holdings. A strict interpretation
of it might well be made to read to
the instant prisoner's detriment.
The courts have, however, taken
judicial notice of the fact that mar-
shals are accustomed to make only
periodic trips to the penitentiary
with prisoners and, hence, of ne-
cessity, the prisoners are jailed, "to
await transportation." Trant v.
United States, 90 F. (2d) 718 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1937). Since a sentence once
started is continuous (assuming
no fault on the part of the pris-
oner), White v. Pearlman, 42 F.
(2d) 788 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930), the
federal statute seems to leave the
law unchanged in this situation. In
the light of the probable intent on
the part of the legislature not to
affect these anomolous cases, the
decision in this instant case can
hardly be condemned.
State courts seem to hold more
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rigidly to the idea that punishment
is the essence of a prison sentence
and the only means of satisfaction,
regardless of delay not the fault of
the prisoner. Ex parte Vance, 90
Cal. 208, 27 Pac. 209 (1891); State
v. Piper, 103 Kan. 794, 176 Pac. 626
(1918); State v. Birbiglia, 155 La.
597, 99 So. 462 (1924); Ex parte
Holden, 31 Okla. Cr. 133, 237 Pac.
622 (1925). However where the
defendant has never been impris-
oned after being sentenced, his
subsequent arrest and commitment
are valid. Middleton v. State, 60
Ark. 1'08, 254 S. W. 342 (1923) (un-
satisfied sentence against one per-
mitted to remain at large on bail
may be enforced by subsequent ar-
rest and commitment); Mann v.
People, 16 Colo. App. 475, 66 Pac.
452 (1901) (defendant cannot es-
cape punishment because of mag-
istrate's failure to commit defend-
ant to jail pending appeal); Egbert
v. Tauer, 191 Ind. 54, 134 N. E. 199
(1921) (delay of judge in issuing
commitment did not satisfy defend-
ant's sentence); Miller v. Evans.
115 Iowa 101, 80 N. W. 198 (1901)
(expiration of time of sentence
from day fixed in judgment not a
satisfaction thereof, when sheriff
failed to issue mittimus); Ex parte
Underwood, 94 Tex. Cr. 157, 248
S. W. 55f (1923) (defendant at
large on appeal bond cannot claim
his term began upon affirmance of
sentence by appellate court). Both
of these groups of cases are usually
based on the rule that time for
starting punisiment is no part of
the sentence, and thus can be
varied after sentence is passed.
State v. Cockerham, 24 N. C. 167
(1842). See WHARTON'S CanNiAL
PROCEDURE (10th ed., 1918) §1864;
(1919) 3 A. L. R. 1572. There is
a small minority, however, holding
that delay of the state cannot im-
pair the prisoner's "rights" and
that the day on which the prisoner
is sentenced will be reckoned as a
part of his imprisonment. Kirby v.
State, 62 Ala. 51 (1878); Corporate
Authorities of Scottsboro v. John-
son, 121 Ala. 397, 25 So. 809 (1899)
(time of sentence expired while
defendant was at liberty by court
order, pending payment of fine).
See State v. Snyder, 98 Mo. 555, 12
S. W. 369 (1889) (defendant who
submitted to erroneous sentence
freed; jury had previously fixed
term at six months, which time
had expired); Ex parte Myers, 44
Mo. 279 (1869); In re Webb, 89
Wis. 354, 62 N. W. 177 (1895) (or-
der of commitment made more
than six months after the sentence,
wherein defendant was sentenced
to six months imprisonment or
payment of a fine; held, order
without authority, even though de-
fendant failed to pay the fine).
The basis of many of the rigid
state holdings is Dolan's Case, 101
Mass. 219 (1869) and Hollon v.
Hopkins, 21 Kan. 459 (1879). Both
involved attempts of escaped con-
victs to reduce their sentence for
time spent at large. From such
facts it is extremely doubtful
whether these holdings were ever
meant to extend beyond these
unique facts. See Hollon v. Hop-
kins, 21 Kan. 459 (1879). A real-
istic, if unlegalistic opinion is Ex-
parte Bugg, 1'45 S. W. 831 (Mo.
App., 1912), in which the judge
would decide each case upon its
own peculiar facts, following such
course as will best promote the
ends of justice. While attractive,
such lack of standard can hardly
be condoned in the light of general
policy.
Although the result of the pres-
ent case seems acceptable, a better
remedy is sugggested in Gorovitz
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v. Sartain, 1 F. (2d) 602 (D. C. N.
D. Ga., 1924), which would require
the prisoner to seek habeas corpus
and move to have-his sentence car-
iied out immediately upon unrea-
sonable delay in execution, rather
than wait until toward the end of
his sentence to raise the objection.
Such a rule seems commendable
in that it would not be a burden
upon the good faith petitioner.
while it would serve to discourage
bad faith applications.
JACK SIMONS.
TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE-
REVERSIBLE ERROR.- [Federal] It
has been said of appellate courts
in this country that they "tower
above the trials of criminal cases
as impregnable citadels of techni-
cality." Kavanaugh, Improvement
of Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice by Exercise of Judicial Power
(1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 217, 222. As
an instance in support of this gen-
erality we offer a recent case in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in-
volving an appeal from a convic-
tion under the Narcotics laws. Ah
Fook Chang v. U. S., 91 F. (2d)
805 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
The situation presented was as
follows: the jury having been in
deliberation for some five hours,
the foreman came to the judge in
his chambers and in the presence
of attorneys for the defense and
prosecution, informed the judge
that the jury wished to be advised
whether the confession of one of
the defendants in the case could be
considered as evidence against the
other. (The latter was present and
not in custody when the confession
was given.) The judge, over de-
fense attorney's objection, gave the
same instruction on the matter
that he had previously given in
the course of the trial in open
court, viz., that the confession of
the one could be used as evidence
against the other defendant. The
foreman retired and a few minutes
later the jury returned to the court
room with a verdict against both
defendants. The Circuit Court of
Appeals felt that this incident re-
quired the granting of a new trial.
Error was found in the fact that
the transaction occurred in cham-
bers without defendants personally
present, whereas a trial is supposed
to take place in a courtroom with
defendants in attendance, provid-
ing they wish to be. The court
was content with merely pointing
out this error. Apparently it was
not enough to require reversal in
itself-probably just something,
impliedly, to add to the other and
more basic error, viz., the instruc-
tion to the jury in the absence of
counsel. Counsel were absent, it
was said, for the foreman relaying
the instruction did so in the jury
room where counsel were neces-
sarily excluded. "On that theory
reversal is required," the court
stated.
The court had pointed out that
not all error is reversible error.
The next step, logically, would
have been to have applied some
test to determine if their second
or basic error was reversible er-
ror. Had they proceeded in this
manner they might well have
asked, as a sensible test, "Has the
error probably affected the ver-
dict?" Applying that test here, the
conclusion must be that the error
does not call for reversal. The in-
struction as a matter of substance
was not error; the error lay in giv-
ing it to the foreman alone to carry
back to the jury, so that counsel
could not be present when it was
given the jury. Would the absence
of this error have changed the vpr-
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dict? All counsel could have seen
to was that the foreman tell the
jury the evidence could be used.
The jury's prompt verdict indicates
they were told the evidence could
be used, for they did use it without
doubt. Thus presence of counsel,
which would have prevented error,
could not have affected the verdict;
and under this test there was no
reversible error.
Doubtless the court considered
this line of reasoning, because the
dissenting judge accepted and
enunciated it. But still the major-
ity felt that "the error may lave
been prejudicial." Without ar-
ticulating any reason for that feel-
ing, the court stated prejudice
would be presumed. A case from
the neighboring Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Little v. U. S.,
73 F. (2d) 861 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934)
was cited as standing for a rule of
presumption in such a situation.
But a careful search through that
case discloses no announcement of
a rule of presumption. The inci-
dent involved in the Little case
consisted of the judge's sending the
court stenographer into the jury
room to read the instructions from
her notes. Probably this case is
stronger on the facts as supporting
reversal for error than the present
case, for the reasons that the sanc-
tity of the jury room properly must
remain inviolate, and that it was
altogether possible the stenog-
rapher had misread or wrongly
emphasized portions of the instruc-
tions. But even if it is a fair fac-
tual precedent as showing a situa-
tion another court found to require
reversal, no rule of presumption is
used to get the result. The rule
or phrase that is employed in the
Little case as a guide is that where
error occurs which within the
range of a "reasonable possibility"
may have affected the verdict, re-
versal is in order. This phrase was
imported from the opinion of Mr.
Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 113 (1933).
No burden of proof was by this
rule placed on the appellee as is
true under the rule of presumption
applied in the present case. Un-
der the rule in the Little case the
court must find a "reasonable pos-
sibility" of injury from error and
may not "presume" it even though
appellee has not shown absence of
injury.
No mention was made in the
present case of the Federal statute
applicable, (19f9) 40 Stat. 1181.
The pertinent portion of this stat-
ute reads as follows: "On the
hearing of any appeal, certiorari,
writ of error, or motion for a new
trial, in any case, civil or criminal,
the court shall give judgment after
an examination of the entire record
before the court, without regard to
technical errors, defects, or excep-
tions which d6 not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties." Di-
vergent views have been expressed
in various Circuit Courts of Appeal
as to the effect of this amendment.
United States v. River Rouge Co.,
269 U. S. 411, 421 (1925). A full
consideration is given the two
views in the Little case, supra. It
is pointed out that some of the
circuits, including the Ninth, have
taken the view, since the amend-
ment, that an appellant must estab-
lish affirmatively, substantial eiTor
and resulting prejudice. These
Ninth Circuit cases, of which no
mention was made by that court in
the present case are Marron v.
United States, 18 F. (2d) 218 (C-
C. A. 9th, 1926); and Miller v.
United States, 47 F. (2d) 120 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1931). In the former
case the following language is used
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at p. 219: "It is argued primarily
that every error is deemed to be
prejudicial. Such a presumption
does not arise." In the latter case
the court says, at p. 121, 'In the
absence of a showing that substan-
tial rights were prejudiced .
appellant has no ground for com-
plaint." Clearly these expressions
show no rule of presumption had
existed in the Ninth Circuit pre-
vious to the present case.
The other view, the one pro-
fessedly adopted in the Little case,
is to the effect that the amendment
did not change the ancient doc-
trine of "harmless error" that had
long pertained in the Federal
courts. This idea appears in a
sense fallacious. Under the doc-
trine of "harmless error" the whole
record was examined, and if it
was shown that no injury to sub-
stantial rights had resulted from
the error it would be ignored. If
there was no proof either of in-
jury or of lack of injury from the
error reversal would be in order,
predicated upon a reasonable pos-
sibility of injury or upon a pre-
sumption of injury. The latter
aspect of the doctrine of harmless
error, presumed injury, had been
the subject of much adverse criti-
cism. First announced in England
about 1835 in the highly technical
Court of Exchequer, it was later
adopted by other English courts
and by most of the American
courts. It was abolished in Eng-
land by the Judicature Acts; but
it continued to flourish in this
country and was the gravamen of
the "considerable agitation" which
finally brought on the 1919 amend-
ment to §269 of the Judicial Code.
1 Wigmore, Evidence, (2d. ed.
1923) §21; Sunderland, The Prob-
lem of Appellate Review (1927)
5 Texas L. Rev. 126, 147; Orfield,
Criminal Appeals (f937) 27 J.
Crim. L. 668, 675, 679. There can
can be little doubt that the pre-
sumed injury aspect of the doc-
trine of harmless error was in-
tended to be abolished by the
amendment. Sunderland, supra
p. 147. The Supreme Court of the
United States has so declared.
Berger v. United States, 295 U. S.
78, 82 (1935).
With an understanding of this
background of the 1919 amendment
it seems the court might well find
in it a direction to them to re-
verse only in case a reasonable
possibility of injury from error ap-
peared. Probably no burden of
proof of injury was intended to be
placed on the appellant. Cf. Hay-
wood v. United States, 268 Fed.
195 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920). But
despite the ambiguous wording the
least that can be said of the statute
is that it indicates a public disap-
proval of technical reversals such
as would often result if injury
must be presumed.
It is true that the same result
may be obtained whether the judge
purports to follow the reasonable
possibility of injury formula or
whether he merely presumes in-
jury. But under the former rule
it is incumbent upon a judge, in
good conscience, to show where
lay the dangers of injury; he is
called upon to articulate his "vague
unrest." If it were made clear to
the courts that this much is ex-
pected of them under the statute,
and if they would accept the re-
sponsibility, it seems that a great
step would be taken to lessen fri-
volous reversals. But, unfortu-
nately, under our constitutional
system of division of powers, noth-
ing can be done about it if the
courts refuse to enunciate clearly
their reasons. No statute can en-
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join upon them this duty; nor, in-
deed, can any statute eradicate
technical reversals. Sunderland,
supra p. 147; Orfield, supra p. 680.
It is common knowledge that not
infrequently the real reasons do
not appear in the opinion. This
can hardly be called intellectual
dishonesty; oftentimes the force
moving the decision never arises
above an emotional state, "an in-
tuition more subtle than any ar-
ticulate major premise," Justice
Holmes was wont to say. This
moving force is with difficulty put
in words, if, indeed, it is com-
monly recognized. Sometimes it is
recognized and expressed, but for
fear of appearing to decide on
"extra-legal" grounds, the decision,
purportedly, is based on technical
legal dogma. See Baker, Rever-
sible Error in Homicide Cases,
(1932) 23 J. Crim. L. 28.
The present case may be ex-
amined in the light of some of these
extra-legal considerations. We are
loath to believe that when the
court said it would presume injury
from an error that under no rea-
sonable possibility could have in-
jured the defendants, it had no
laudable motive for employing
such dialectics. But when an at-
tempt is made to indicate what
may have been the unexpressed
forces moving the decision, forces
that, perchance, the judge himself
did not consciously consider, the
ground becomes unsteady. How-
ever, a few suppositions will be in-
dulged in of what might have been
factors motivating the result. First,
the defendants were members of
the Chinese race, a mother and her
son. Foreigners are often treated
kindly by appellate courts. Baker,
supra p. 33. Second, the officers
searched the son's room without a
warrant, finding opium on a table.
"There is a dispute in the evi-
dence as to whether or not the
entry made by the officers was
permissive." The court could not
find evidence clearly showing the
entry not to be permissive; but
they might well have been skep-
tical that it was permissive, pic-
turing the scene of a startled
Chinaman suddenly confronted by
police officers demanding entrance
into his room, he well knowing
damaging evidence of law violation
was in full view on a table. But
it was the Chinaman against the
officers and the lower court had
believed the officers; the appellate
court had to accept, on paper, the
finding that defendant had waived
his constitutional right against un-
reasonable searches and seizures
by permitting the entrance. Third,
the signed statements of the de-
fendants were obtained after a
questioning lasting intermittently
from 3 o'clock in the afternoon
until midnight. Again it was
mother and son against the officers
on the issue of volition in the giv-
ing of the statements. Again the
trial court had believed the officers
and "the trial court's judgment
thereon must be sustained." A
possibility of oppressive before-
trial treatment may elicit leniency
in the appellate court. Baker,
supra p. 43.
If it were known what the judges
understood to be the condition of
criminal investigation and admin-
istration in Hawaii, a better opin-
ion could be given as to whether
or not any of the above considera-
tions influenced the decision. In
the absence of any information on
the subject of conditions there, it
would seem to be a better guess
that none of these factors was im-
portant in motivating the decision.
Indeed, the nationality of the de-
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fendants considered with the na-
ture of the crime, and the apparent
reasonableness of the police opera-
tions, would seem to militate for
affirming the conviction.
At any rate the court indicated
that the objection on which re-
versal was predicated, viz., the out-
of-court incident, constituted a
more serious question. In con-
sidering the unexpressed reason
for reversing on this harmless
error, the conclusion must be that
here is another instance of the age-
old conflict between formalism and
teleology; between a system of ad-
ministration calculated to guard
against injustice generally, and
justice in the particular case. (This
conflict is peculiarly acute in crim-
inal law where loss in the particu-
lar case may prevent the defen-
dant from profiting later by a good
precedent set at his expense, as he
might do, for example, in the field
of property law.) The court in the
present case simply looked to
form, and ignored effect in the par-
ticular case. Usually it cannot be
said that a court is wrong in choos-
ing one or the other of these ap-
proaches; it is a matter of funda-
mental differences. But there are
instances where the result in the
particular case is so absurd, and
there is such slight possibility that
the error will occur again to dis-
turb the even course of admin-
istration, that one feels constrained
to criticize.
Such an instance is the present
case. However, not all the fault
may be placed on the appellate
court. There is little excuse for
the lethargy of the trial judge in
conducting part of the trial in his
chambers; there is little excuse for
the failure of counsel, both for
prosecution and accused to object
to the out-of-court procedure.
(In fact counsel for defendants ob-
jected merely to the substance of
the instruction, and by requesting
that a different instruction be
given in the chambers really in-
vited the error.) But the upper
court proved itself to be an "im-
pregnable citadel of technicality"
in failing to get a plausible result
despite the errors of those below.
Furthermore, its technique, first, of
finding its decisive doctrine in a
case which contained no such doc-
trine, second, of overlooking its
own recent decisions holding that
the doctrine did not exist in the
Ninth Circuit, and third, of ignor-
ing a statute which authorities had
said outlawed such a doctrine in
the Federal courts, can hardly be
justified.
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